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Hazard: "Announcement" by Federal Judicial Nominees

"ANNOUNCEMENT;'
BY FEDERAL JUDICIAL NOMINEES
Geoffrey C. Hazard,Jr.*

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court's decision in Republican Party of Minnesota v.
White' has understandably caused consternation among the American
judiciary and legal profession. The principal concern aroused, apart from
the holding itself, is whether restrictions may validly be imposed on
judges and judicial candidates on forms of speech other than speeches in
judicial election campaigns. Speeches by the candidates in judicial
election campaigns was the issue immediately involved in White and I
will have a few observations regarding that issue. However, my principal
inquiry proceeds as follows:
- If judicial candidates in selection systems based on popular
elections can be permitted to "announce" their views on pending or
impending legal issues, as a matter of Constitutional law it would seem
that the same right is enjoyed by judicial candidates in selection systems
based on appointment.
- Since judicial candidates in selection systems based on popular
elections are permitted to announce their views on pending or impending
legal issues, as a practical matter they will often be obliged to do so
under pressure of the electoral contests.
* Since judicial candidates in appointive systems will be permitted
to state their views on such issues, no legal rules can prevent interested
agencies in systems using an appointive process from demanding that
candidates provide such statements. For example, the President, prior to
sending a nomination to the Senate, could demand from a prospective
nominee a statement of views on abortion or affirmative action or the
scope of the Eleventh Amendment. Presumably a statement in writing.
Trustee Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
1. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
*
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- If the President could require such a statement, the Senate
Judiciary Committee and the Senate itself would seem equally
empowered to do so. The American Bar Association could, although I
hope it will not, assert that such a statement is a necessary condition for
obtaining a positive review by its Judicial Qualifications Committee.
There is thus some possibility that eliciting such statements will
become a norm in the federal judicial appointive process.
Part of my analysis is that elective and appointive systems are not
aIs fundamentally different as the White decision appeared to assume.
I.

THE HOLDING IN WHITE

The question in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White was the
validity under the First Amendment of a Minnesota rule that a candidate
for judicial office could not "announce his or her views on disputed legal
or political issues."' 2 The Court's decision was stated chiefly through
quotations from earlier decisions:
"[D]ebate on the qualifications of candidates" is "at the core of our
electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms .... Eu, 489
U.S., at 222-23 (internal quotation marks omitted). "The role that
elected officials play in our society makes it all the more imperative
that they be allowed freely to express themselves on matters of current
public importance." Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 395 (1962)....
We have never allowed the government to prohibit candidates 3 from
communicating relevant information to voters during an election.
The precedents from which these quotations were taken concerned
election to offices other than in the judiciary.4 The court said that made
no difference; an election is an election and the right of free speech
applies equally in all such political processes. 5
In pronouncing the crucial point that judicial elections are not
different from other elections, the Court made much of what it
considered to be history. 6 It noted that restrictions on speech in judicial
elections made their appearance only in the twentieth century, whereas

2. Id. at 768 (quoting MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) (2002)).
3. Id. at 781-82.
4. See generally Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214 (1989)
(concerning members of state and county central committees); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375
(1962) (concerning a sheriff up for reelection).
5. See White, 536 U.S. at 783-84.
6. See id. at 785.
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selection of judges by popular election went way back to the beginning
of the nineteenth century. 7 The Court said:
By the time of the Civil War, the great majority of States elected their
judges. We know of no restrictions upon statements that could be made
by judicial candidates (including judges) throughout the 19th and the
first quarter of the 20th century. Indeed, judicial elections were
8
generally partisan during this period ....
The Court cited respectable scholarly and professional authority for
these propositions of legal history. So far, so good.
The Court then went on to say:
Thus, not only were judicial candidates (including judges) discussing
disputed legal and political issues on the campaign trail, but they were
touting party affiliations and angling for party nominations all the
while.
The Court's opinion offers no support for this proposition, which
poses an issue to which I return below.
In any event, the holding in White addresses speech in judicial
election campaigns. 10 It does not address other judicial speech. For
example, it does not address whether the prohibitions on ex parte
communication still validly restrain a judge from listening to such
communications, or validly prohibit a lawyer from addressing them to a
judge outside of permissible forensic settings. It does not address
whether a judge may commit reversible error, or incur other
consequences, for making intemperate remarks from on or off the bench.
It also does not address whether the judge may be subject to recusal on
account of statements he has made during an election campaign or in
other settings outside of court. The decision does suggest that a judicial
candidate may frequent the company of partisan politicians, the Court
having referred to this as "angling for party nominations.""
The decision also does not address various collateral issues
associated with judicial elections, particularly fund-raising. The lower
courts, probably eventually the Supreme Court itself, will have to work
through the intersection of the White decision, about the First

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

See id.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 786.
at 789.
See id.
Id.at 786.
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Amendment rights of judges, with Buckley v. Valeo, 12 about the First
Amendment rights of others.
Nor does the decision address the First Amendment as it might
apply to court officers other than judges. If judges have a Constitutional
right to tout themselves, the same right would seem to extend to their
bailiffs and clerks.
Further out, but perhaps more serious, is application of the concept
of free speech to lawyers. Is the rule of confidentiality, requiring a
lawyer to maintain secrecy of client intimacies, possibly within the
scope of the White decision? For example, could a lawyer, on the basis
of the First Amendment, defend against a malpractice claim that is
predicated on the lawyer's wrongful disclosure of client confidences? In
other words, does a lawyer have a constitutional right to disclose a
client's secrets? I certainly think not and hope not. However, there have
already been cases where lawyers have invoked the right of free speech
as a limitation on rules governing their conduct. 13 Given the decision in
White, there certainly will be more cases in which lawyers invoke First
Amendment arguments.
In all such situations, the rejoinder will be that the state has a proper
interest in imposing prior restraints against violation of what
traditionally has been regarded as the lawyer's highest duty. A similar
state interest-protecting judicial impartiality-was invoked in White,
but without success. 14 I wager lawyers who try to claim a First
Amendment right to blab on a client outside the narrow channels now
permitted by the ethics rules will lose. 5 However, it is not easy to state
the metric by which a lawyer can be restrained from making utterances
about a case where essentially the same utterances would be
Constitutionally protected if made by a judge. A whole new field of
controversy has been opened in the law governing lawyers.
And of course the logic of the White decision has potential
application in the law of trade secrets, confidentiality agreements,
agreements not to compete, and still other fields.
But to return to speech by judicial candidates.

12. 424 U.S. 1, 39 (1976) (concerning the constitutional issues surrounding the Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971, which restricted the amount of money any one individual could
expend towards the campaign of a candidate for government office).
13. See, e.g., Gentile v. State Bar ofNev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1058 (1991).
14. See White, 536 U.S. at 777.
15.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. (1999).
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II.

OLD-STYLE JUDICIAL ELECTIONS

The Court in White evidently assumed that in judicial elections, as
they were adopted in the nineteenth century, the substantive views of the
candidates were routinely vented in the campaigns. The Court also
evidently assumed that the venting was done by the candidates
themselves. (It should be kept in mind that the Minnesota rule did not
prohibit discussion of a judicial candidate's views; the rule prohibited
the candidatesthemselves from stating their views.) However, the Court
cited no authority for its proposition that "judicial candidates [in
nineteenth century elections were] discussing disputed legal and political
I have not had opportunity to do
issues on the campaign trail. ..
proper research on these propositions, but I have serious doubts about
the accuracy of this general proposition.
In the first place, the term "election" is generic. The Columbia
Encyclopedia,17 for example, refers to elections for the office of Pope of
the Roman Catholic Church, in which the electors are the college of
Cardinals. No election speeches there. It refers also to election of the
Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, in which the electors were a
handful of German heads of state. No election speeches there. There are
all kinds of corporate and local government elections in which elections
speeches are, or traditionally were, considered outre.
Moreover, in elections for political office through some part of the
nineteenth century, there was a strong tradition, though one not
universally observed, that candidates should not make speeches about
themselves. It was thought unseemly for a candidate to tout himself, the
thought perhaps also being that self-serving statements were inherently
unreliable. That tradition still had force as late as 1896. William
McKinley, the Republican candidate for President in that year, famously
campaigned by sitting on the veranda of his Ohio homestead. The
famous debates between Senator Douglas and candidate Lincoln are not
an exception to the tradition. The debates did not directly address an
electorate, because senators in those days were elected by the state
legislatures.
The original concept of popular election was that the electorate
would gather in an informal convention to select the best person for the
job, quite as school boards and corporate boards elect a chairperson. In a
typical nineteenth century election, the men (women could not vote)
16. White, 536 U.S. at 786.
17. See generally COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA (Paul Lagasse, ed. 2000).
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gathered at the appointed place to exchange gossip, toasts and boasts,
and political opinions. Decision was often by consensus, but in any
event the candidates generally were supposed to remain modestly at
home. These local conventions are the antecedent of the modem national
party convention. The tradition that candidates should be reticent has left
a modem residue in the norm that the successful candidate for President
appears before the convention only after the choice has been made.
The reform, that selection of judges be by popular election, was
adopted in this context. The idea was to get selection of judges out of
smoke-filled rooms, not that judgeships should necessarily be
determined by contested elections. Popular opinion differentiates
between judges and other public officials. According to popular opinion,
18
judges are supposed to be apolitical, just as President Bush has said.
On that premise, popular election does not equate to election campaign,
let alone to campaigns in which the candidates themselves are expected
or permitted to speak their views. In most states and communities today,
the old tradition holds concerning judicial elections. Judicial candidates
are not supposed to campaign, but to win or lose according to reputation.
Candidates are selected by various procedures and the selection is then
put out for popular ratification. In many rural counties, the nominating
committee consists of the local bar, who select a suitable successor for
the retiring incumbent.
A serious problem in the modem urbanized context is that judicial
candidates are unknown to the electorate, and typically remain that
way. 19 Active campaigns for judicial office have been exceptional and
the candidates have typically remained more or less unknown. All this
may be changing, particularly in election of appellate judges. The
"interest groups" are hard at work and many judicial elections are now
politicized.20 But that development does not dissipate the public interest
in restricting judicial speech in judicial elections. On the contrary,
keeping judicial elections more judicial becomes a stronger community
interest.
18. See, e.g., JOANNE DOROSHOW & STEPHEN C. HALPERN, CENTER FOR JUSTICE AND
DEMOCRACY, ATTACKING THE BENCH, at http://www.centerjd.org/press/opinions/001114.htm

(2000).
19.

See, e.g., Delmar Karlen & Joseph M. Miller, A New JudicialArticle for New York, at

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/history/elecbook/newjudartlpg4.htm (last visited April 21, 2004)
(stating that "U]udicial offices are of such 'low visibility' that people are scarcely aware of them
and do not know for whom they are voting...").
20. See RESEARCH AND POLICY COMM., COMM. FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, JUSTICE FOR
HIRE: IMPROVING JUDICIAL SELECTION 2 (2002), available at http://www.ced.org/docs/report/

reportjudicial.pdf.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol32/iss4/12

6

Hazard: "Announcement" by Federal Judicial Nominees

2004]

"ANNOUNCEMENT"

The opinion in White made much of the fact that restrictions on
judicial speech are a twentieth century invention. 2' The opinion further
suggested that the restrictions were foisted on the public by the
American Bar Association.22 However, there is another understanding
that takes equal or better account of the historical sequence, which is as
follows:
Prior to the twentieth century, candidates for judicial office, even
more so than candidates for other offices, did not make campaign
speeches. That was and still is the popular norm, consistent with the
concept that judges should be apolitical.23 As the country became more
urbanized and impersonal, around the turn of the twentieth century, there
was increasing incentive for judicial candidates to campaign. The
incentive was especially strong for opponents of incumbents, because
incumbents typically tried to be apolitical. The imposition of speech
restrictions aimed to confirm the traditional understanding that
judgeships were apolitical. Because the restrictions expressed a
traditional and widely shared conception of judicial office, they were
accepted by the political branches and by the electorate.
On this basis, it is the Supreme Court that has embraced a
supposition that judgeships-particularly appellate judgeships-are
political like other elective offices. Perhaps the skepticism expressed
here about the historical foundation of the Court's opinion will
encourage other courts, and the Supreme Court itself, to limit the scope
of the White decision.
III.

ANNOUNCEMENTS BY CANDIDATES FOR APPOINTIVE OFFICE

Nevertheless, White makes the right of free political speech
available to candidates for appointive judicial office.24 That includes
candidates for federal judicial office and particularly candidates for the
Supreme Court.
The underlying problem, of course, is that judicial office is political
in some undeniable sense. That is true specifically of federal judicial
office and particularly the office of Justice of the Supreme Court.
21. See White, 536 U.S. at 785 (2002) ("We know of no restrictions upon statements that
could be made by judicial candidates (including judges) throughout the 19th and the first quarter of
the 20th century.").
22. See id.
at 786.
23. See., e.g., DOROSHOW & HALPERN, supra note 18.
24. See generally White, 536 U.S. 765 (finding a free speech right for judicial candidates
running for election as well as for appointed judges).
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Thus, Brown v. Board of Education,252 Roe v. Wade26 and the recent
decision on "gay rights" 27 are political in some sense. The same is true,
of course, of Marbury v. Madison,28 the Dred Scott decision, 29 the
"Switch in Time" decisions of the Court under Chief Justice Hughes30
and the anti-regulation decisions of the "Old Court" that preceded the
so-called switch. 3' The same is true of many lower court decisions, for
example, the acquittal of O.J.32 or the Louima verdicts. 33 More
fundamentally, all judicial decisions involve implicitly the exercise of
the state's coercive authority, which is political by definition.
Of course, in some sense judicial decisions are also not political, or
seek and at least pretend to be such. That was true, perhaps most
notably, of Bush v. Gore.34 But that is also true of the Brown decision
and the decisions in Roe v. Wade and the gay rights decision. I recall in
law school the suggestion by Professor Julius Goebel that the evolution
of the common law in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries was not only
legal but also political. It has since seemed to me that if judicial
decisions in the twelfth century were political in some sense, they must
still be so. In the years since my graduation I have had little occasion to
think otherwise. One can even find analysts outside the United States
that are now willing to concede as much.
Accordingly, to me there is a boring and empty character to debate's
in the academy, the courts and the media over whether a judicial
decision and the judicial process are or are not political in some sense.
Of course they are. But judicial decisions and the judicial process also
are not political in some sense. This is true even of decisions that, in the
eyes of some observers, are "obviously" political. In my opinion, Bush v.
Gore was legal and judicial at least in some sense. Whatever else can be
said about the issue in that case, it was no solution to accept a further
vote canvass in some Florida counties but not others, nor in Florida but
25.
26.
27.
28.

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
5 U.S. 137 (1803).

29. 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
30. See, e.g., W. Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
31. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
32. See Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Jury Reform at the End of the Century: Real Agreement, Real
Changes, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 213, 221 (1998) (noting the effect on verdicts from feelings
regarding race).
33. United States v. Volpe, 78 F. Supp. 2d 76 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); United States v. Schwarz, 283
F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2002).
34.

531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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not other States. By exclusion, finality had to be resolved with the
returns that were available.
The problem of differentiation between the political and the judicial
is two-fold. On one hand, there are distinctions to be made between
decision-making in the judiciary and decision-making in the political
branches of Congress and the Executive. On the other hand, the
distinctions cannot be drawn clearly and cleanly. Indeed, in my opinion
some decisions by the courts dealing with fundamental political issues
are justifiable precisely because the issues were so fundamental and
therefore so necessarily political. I think Brown certainly was in that
category, and so also was the steel seizure case in the Korean War,35 and
perhaps also the recent gay rights decision in Lawrence v. Texas.
In the appointment of a Supreme Court justice, all these
definitional, political, and Constitutional concerns are on the table, or at
least under the table. So also do they exist, to a lesser degree, in the
appointment of other federal judges and the selection of judges in other
appointive systems. Every participant in the appointive process-the
President and his advisers, the Senators and theirs-thinks about these
concerns, and many other people do so as well. And so also does any
nominee or candidate who has the background and qualifications to be
seriously considered. I have never met an American judge who does not
think about politics some of the time.
Heretofore, nominees for judicial office have been able to refuse to
answer questions about their views on issues likely to come before the
court. Until about a few generations ago, it was generally assumed to be
improper to ask a nominee direct questions on such issues. Questions
therefore were not asked and refusals or deflections of answers were
unnecessary. The confirmation hearings of Thurgood Marshall were
almost a charade in this respect. Everyone knew what his views would
be, or at least his approach, on certain issues concerning race. Many
Senators were concerned that he would be too extreme. But no one
asked him. Perhaps that was only because the nomination had been
presented by Lyndon Johnson.36
However, in the case of Robert Bork things worked out differently
and badly for Bob, who is an admired friend. Bork had indeed
"announced" his views on a number of subjects, some in decisions while

35.

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).

36.

See ROBERT A. CARO, MASTER OF THE SENATE VOL. 2 xxii (1982).
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on the D.C. Circuit and others in less constrained circumstances.37 These
announcements were turned against him, a3 in respects that I consider
unfair. In the case of Justice Thomas, the candidate turned the issue on
its head, successfully denouncing as racist questions what then and now
could properly be asked of a judicial candidate. Perhaps the after-shocks
of the Bork and Thomas hearings were a caution to those interested in
the political dimensions of judicial selection. In any event, the Clinton
nominees, Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, got through under the old rules.
CONCLUSION

Nominees for federal judicial office now have a right to speak their
views on issues likely to come before the Court. 39 But they also have a
right to refuse to do so. 40 No doubt many of them refuse, relying on their
records as a sufficient basis for evaluating their fitness for office. Most
of them probably will be successful in this approach. However, they will
no longer be able to say they cannot answer, only that they will not
answer.
An approach I might counsel, at least for some nominees, is that
there be a refusal, based on the ground that it is improper for a nominee
to judicial office to answer such questions, and that the ground be
justified by reference to American tradition. This would certainly not be
unlawful under the White decision, nor would it be unethical. 4'
Rather, refusal would simply be on the basis of Constitutional
propriety. This is, or is similar to, a normative basis suggested by Justice
Rehnquist in his opinion in Laird v. Tatum.42 The refusal would be on
much the same basis as Mr. Greenspan would decline to answer
questions addressed to future decisions about the interest rate, or
Secretary Powell about his discussions with the Israelis and Palestinians.
37.

See, e.g., Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1398 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (expressing his

belief that homosexual conduct will almost certainly have negative effects if practiced within the
military, regardless of an absence of sociological data on the subject); Joseph R. Tybor, In the
Shadow of Bork, Kennedy Thrives Despite Sketchy Testimony, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 20, 1987, at C4
(stating that Bork openly condemned Supreme Court decisions "expanding individual rights over
the last half-century, including recognition of marital rights, decisions on abortion and some that
struck down forms of racial and sexual discrimination").
38. See Susan Milligan, PickeringRejection Sets off Nominee War, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 16,
2002, at A l (noting that Bork's nomination was defeated due to "complaints about his conservative
ideology").
39. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002).
40. Seeid.at783n.I1.
41. Seeid.at788.
42. Compare Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824 (1972), with White, 536 U.S. at 783 n.1 1.
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Answering such questions would be profoundly impolitic and therefore
improper.
It is sobering, however, to contemplate hearings on a nominee
whose views, from and off the bench, were as strongly expressed as
those of Justice Scalia. Some might think there would be a contradiction
between the tenor of those views and a norm of prudential reserve.
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